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| **UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)** |
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**UT Neutral citation number: [2015] UKUT 0044 (LC)**

**UTLC Case Number: LP/11/2013**

## TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007

***RESTRICTIVE COVENANT – discharge – enclosure of amenity land into private gardens – easement – application under grounds (a), (aa), (b) and (c), s84(1) Law of Property Act 1925 – application refused.***

**IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER**

**SECTION 84 OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925**

**BY**

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1) ALAN AND GILLIAN CLARKE**  **(2) ADRIAN AND GAYNOR DAVIS**  **(3) ARTHUR AND LINDA SANSON**  **(4) MR KARL BOWKER** | **Applicants** |

**Re: Land to the Rear of 5 and 7 Hillend Lane,**

**and to the Rear of 12 and 13 Home Farm Avenue,**

**Mottram,**

**Cheshire.**

**SK14**

**Before: Mr P D McCrea FRICS**

**Sitting at: Manchester IAC, First Floor, Piccadilly Exchange, Moseley Street, Manchester**

**M1 4AH**

**on**

**7 November 2014**

Mr Alan Clarke, with permission of the Tribunal, for the applicants

*James Holmes-Milner* instructed by MTA Taylor Moore LLPfor the objectors

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The following cases are referred to in this decision.

*Re Bass Ltd’s Application* (1973) 26 P&CR 156

*Re Martins’ Application* (1989) 57 P&CR 119

**DECISION**

**Introduction**

1. This is an application to discharge a restriction preventing the erection of fences and other structures on that part of amenity land owned by the applicants, on a small housing estate in Mottram, Cheshire. The applicants say that the relevant part of the amenity land had fallen into neglect, and was unused. They erected fences in 2012 and enclosed the parcels of land into their domestic gardens. The objectors, who comprise the majority of the other residents entitled to use the land and are listed in the Appendix to this decision, say that the amenity land should be kept in common use; that there is a restriction against the erection of fences; and that in any event they have a right of way over the land which the erection of fences has prevented them from exercising.
2. At some time before 1980, a subsidiary of Longdendale Housing Society (“the society”) built 40 houses on land between Hillend Lane and Home Farm Avenue, Mottram, Cheshire. The houses were arranged around an area of amenity land (“the amenity land”) although not all of them directly backed onto it. The amenity land is best described as being in the shape of an hourglass or bow tie, in that the north east and south west elements are larger and are connected by a narrower element in the middle. The land slopes down from north east to south west, and is described by the parties as the upper land and lower land. The applicants’ part of the amenity land forms the majority of the lower land.
3. In March 1981 the houses on the estate were sold off individually. Included in each of the freehold sales was a proportion of the amenity land. These proportions were contiguous such that the whole of the amenity land was disposed of. The application land is that part of the amenity land that lies to the rear of 5 and 7 Hillend Lane, Mottram, SK14 6JR and 12 and 13 Home Farm Avenue, Mottram, SK14 6JS.
4. The applicants are:

Mr Alan and Mrs Gillian Clarke, who own 7 Hillend Lane;

Mr Adrian and Mrs Gaynor Davis, who own 12 Home Farm Avenue;

Mr Arthur and Mrs Linda Sanson, who own 13 Home Farm Avenue; and

Mr Karl Bowker, who owns 5 Hillend Lane.

1. The application land has is burdened by restrictive covenants contained within conveyances dated 5 March 1981 between the Longdendale (Hillend) Housing Society Limited and each of John Edmund Pully (7 Hillend Lane), Mr and Mrs Davis (12 Home Farm Avenue), Mr and Mrs Sanson (13 Home Farm Avenue) and Douglas and Vera Davies (5 Hillend Lane). Mr and Mrs Davis purchased 12 Home Farm Avenue in March 2003 and Mr Bowker purchased 5 Hillend Lane in November 2012, and became bound by the covenants.
2. The second schedule of each conveyance granted the purchaser:

“(b) The right (in common as aforesaid) to use for the purposes of recreation only the areas shown hatched blue on the said plan (hereinafter called “the Amenity Areas”)”

1. The third schedule reserved from the conveyance for the benefit of the vendor and those claiming thorough it:

“(b) The right to use the Amenity Areas for the purposes of recreation only”

1. Accordingly each of the houses has mutual rights to use the whole of the amenity land for recreation.
2. So far as material to this application, the fourth schedule contained the following:

“ (a) …

(b) not to erect any building or structure whatsoever which shall include a boundary wall or fence on any part of the Estate Footpaths and Amenity Areas as may be included in the property hereby conveyed thereby insuring that the same shall remain unobstructed at all times.

(c) to pay 1/40th of the expense incurred from time to time of cleaning, maintaining or repairing and replacing the Estate Footpaths, Amenity Areas and the Service Installations.

(d) ….

(e) …”

1. The application is for the discharge of the restriction at paragraph (b) of the fourth schedule under sub-paragraphs (a), (aa), (b) and (c) of s84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (“the Act”).
2. I inspected the amenity land and surrounding area on 6 November 2014 accompanied by the applicants and many of the objectors.
3. The applicants were represented at the hearing by Mr Alan Clarke. Mr James Holmes-Milner of counsel appeared for two of the objectors, Mr Jason and Mrs Lynda Clark who own 1 Home Farm Avenue. Whilst present at the hearing, none of the other objectors were represented or spoke and accordingly Mr Holmes-Milner in effect presented the case on behalf of all of the objectors.

**Facts**

1. From the evidence I find the following facts.
2. In late 2005, Mr Michael Walker, the owner of 14 Home Farm Avenue, enclosed his part of the amenity land with fencing. A retrospective planning application was made and Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (“the council”) granted permission for Mr Walker’s enclosure on 4 November 2005. Mr Walker does not apply to the Tribunal for discharge and plays no part in this application. His land was at the western edge of the amenity land, and is now landlocked by the application land.
3. Following this, the applicants obtained planning consent from the council on 16 July 2010 under reference 10/00275/FUL for the change of use of the application land to private garden areas.
4. In March 2010 Mr Tony Walker, the former owner of No.5 Hillend Lane, fenced off the land to the rear of his property and in May 2012 the remaining areas of the application land were fenced off.
5. Following objections from the other occupiers of the estate, the applicants apply to the Tribunal for discharge of paragraph (b) of the fourth schedule of each conveyance, preventing the erection of fencing. There is no application to discharge or modify any of the other restrictions.

**Statute**

1. The Act provides as follows:

“84(1) The Upper Tribunal shall (without prejudice to any concurrent jurisdiction of the court) have power from time to time, on the application of any person interested in any freehold land affected by any restriction arising under covenant or otherwise as to the user thereof or the building thereon, by order wholly or partially to discharge or modify any such restriction on being satisfied—

(a) that by reason of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the Upper Tribunal may deem material, the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete; or

(aa) that (in a case falling within subsection (1A) below) the continued existence thereof would impede some reasonable user of the land for public or private purposes or, as the case may be, would unless modified so impede such user; or

(b) that the persons of full age and capacity for the time being or from time to time entitled to the benefit of the restriction, whether in respect of a estates in fee simple or any lesser estates or interests in the property to which the benefit of the restriction is annexed, have agreed, either expressly or by implication, by their acts or admissions, to the same being discharged or modified; or

(c) that the proposed discharge or modification will not injure the persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction: and an order discharging or modifying a restriction under this subsection may direct the applicant to pay to any person entitled to the benefit of the restriction such sum by way of consideration as the Tribunal may think it just to award under one, but not both, of the following heads, that is to say, either—

(i) a sum to make up for any loss or disadvantage suffered by that person in consequence of the discharge or modification; or

(ii) a sum to make up for any effect which the restriction had, at the time when it was imposed, in reducing the consideration then received for the land affected by it.

(1A) Subsection (1)(aa) above authorises the discharge or modification of a restriction by reference to its impeding some reasonable user of land in any case in which the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the restriction, in impeding that user, either—

(a) does not secure to persons entitled to the benefit of it any practical benefits of substantial value or advantage to them; or

(b) is contrary to the public interest;

and that money will be an adequate compensation for the loss or disadvantage (if any) which any such person will suffer from the discharge or modification.

(1B) In determining whether a case is one falling within subsection (1A) above, and in determining whether (in any such case or otherwise) a restriction ought to be discharged or modified, the Upper Tribunal shall take into account the development plan and any declared or ascertainable pattern for the grant or refusal of planning permissions in the relevant areas, as well as the period at which and context in which the restriction was created or imposed and any other material circumstances.

(1C) It is hereby declared that the power conferred by this section to modify a restriction includes power to add such further provisions restricting the user of or the building on the land affected as appear to the Upper Tribunal to be reasonable in view of the relaxation of the existing provisions, and as may be accepted by the applicant; and the Upper Tribunal may accordingly refuse to modify a restriction without some such addition.”

**The case for the applicants**

1. Mr Clarke said that the application related solely to the lower area of the amenity area and did not seek to alter the status of the upper area or the estate footpaths, or alter the terms of other property’s deeds. He said the lower area was different in character, access and locality to the rest of the amenity land. The council had noted that it was “the smallest, least attractive parcel” and that it offered little in terms of improving the visual amenity or outlook to the surrounding residents. He said that the owner of 14 Home Farm Drive enclosed his part of the lower land in 2005. Planning consent was granted for the change of use from vacant land to private garden and the erection of the fence on 23 December 2005. The occupier of 5 Hillend Lane fenced off that element of the amenity land between 5 and 7 Hillend Lane in 2010 and on 16 July 2010 planning consent was granted for the change of use of the lower land to private gardens. With the benefit of full planning consent, and with a time limit of 3 years, the applicants completed the planned work and fenced off their respective areas in May 2012. Mr Clarke said that despite the objectors being aware of these steps, it was not until the work had been completed that any formal objection was made through solicitors. In delaying, the objectors had acted unreasonably and the applicants had been involved in great expense.
2. Mr Clarke said that the estate was originally constructed with a social housing ethos, with co-ownership of the amenity land encouraging and enforcing community benefits. It was arguable that the wording of the deeds reflected a wish by the parties to reflect the co-ownership ethos whereby the costs of maintaining the estate fell equally on all households. However once the association ceased to exist, there was no mechanism to enable this. The estate was now wholly owner occupied and had much more insular and independent occupiers. The ethos of the estate had changed from one of mutual support to one of individual determination. The covenants were therefore out of date.
3. He said that for about two years after the sale of the estate to the individual owners, maintenance was funded by contributions and carried out by a few volunteers. The applicants have always been prepared to support the upkeep and contributed to fund-raising. However, over the last 30 years the amenity area, particularly the lower land, was abandoned. Mr Clarke highlighted the planning officer’s report dated 16 July 2010 which said “over the intervening years there have been minor incursions into the amenity land by the residents whose houses back onto it, and one larger incursion that has the benefit of planning consent.” The application for the land at the rear of 12 Home Farm Avenue was for “a change of use from vacant land to private use as a garden and erecting a fence around it” and was described as “vacant land, last used as a communal recreation area over 12 years ago”. He said that despite there being responsibility for paying 1/40th of any costs incurred from time to time, in the absence of any provision within the deeds to how this could be managed, and following the demise of the society, it was inevitable that the amenity land would fall in disuse.
4. Mr Clarke said that the application land was a considerable distance from some of the objectors’ properties and whilst there was a restricted view of it from the upper floors of 9 Hillend Lane and 11 Home Farm Avenue, the application land was not visible from properties that did not back onto it. He said that the persons entitled to the benefit of the right in the covenant have never utilised the lower land for over 30 years and there was arguably an implied abandonment of the rights and covenants. He said that at my site inspection some of the objectors had commented that they had not been aware that the lower land existed.
5. The only access to the lower land was via a narrow strip that led from the upper area but this was partially blocked by mature sycamores and was only accessible by the very able-bodied. The trees were subject to individual Tree Preservation Orders.
6. He referred to the planning officer’s report in relation to the lower land which said that:

“The piece of land in question is currently in an overgrown and neglected state and has clearly not been actively used recently for amenity use”

1. Mr Clarke submitted that the restriction, in impeding the applicants’ proposed use, did not secure to the persons entitled to the benefit of it any practical benefits of substantial value or advantage. The council had twice considered the lower land in planning applications and concluded that private gardens was a reasonable use of the lower land which at that time had been in a poor state. The changes to the lower land now provide an enhanced visual amenity; there were a number of attractive bushes and fruiting apple trees. Ingress into the curtilage of the houses by vermin had disappeared and invasive plant species were no longer a perennial issue.
2. By its location, shape and access, the lower land was unsuited to unsupervised play and effective maintenance from the upper part of the amenity area. The long period of lack of use and maintenance as an amenity area implied abandonment on the part of the occupiers of the Hillend Estate. It also posed a security risk to the adjoining properties in its former open and overgrown state.
3. Insofar as the grounds under s84(1) of the Act are concerned, the applicants’ case was as follows:

In respect of (a) the applicants said that the restriction should be considered to be obsolete because the nature and character of the estate had altered since the restrictions were entered into. All of the houses were now owner-occupied with a completely different ethos to the communal ethic under the association.

In respect of (aa), they considered that the covenant impeded reasonable user of the land. Planning permission had been granted for private gardens which was a reasonable use and this was impeded by the covenant. The restriction did not secure practical benefits of substantial value or advantage to the objectors.

In respect of (b), they considered that the objectors had knowingly let the land fall into disuse and therefore by implication the restriction had been abandoned.

Finally, in respect of (c) the applicants considered that the release of the covenant would not injure the objectors. The application land was not capable of being used, it had little or no amenity value to the objectors, it did not impede their views, did not add value to their properties. No injury would be caused to them by the restriction’s discharge.

1. Mr Clarke concluded by stressing that the applicants were not seeking a “land grab” for any financial gain; they supported the maintenance of the upper land, which was different in character, as amenity land. They were simply seeking a pragmatic approach to solve a long-standing problem.

**The case for the objectors**

*Mr Jason Clark*

1. Mr Clark, who with his wife owns No.1 Home Farm Avenue, gave evidence. He and his family brought their property in January 2010 but Mrs Clark had lived in the area since childhood. He said that the amenity land was maintained on a voluntary basis and whilst there was no mechanism for upkeep, those who wanted to use it generally looked after it. The younger families on the estate were keen to use the land but as children got older this diminished. There were a number of younger families on the estate which frequently used the land for cricket, small parties, fireworks, tennis etc.
2. Mr Clark said that the appeal land was not the only part of the amenity land which neighbours had attempted to enclose within their gardens. Some years before, the owners of No.13 Hillend Lane moved their fence out onto the amenity land but having received a solicitor’s letter reinstated it. He said that should the owners of say 13 Hillend Lane and 5 Home Farm avenue both do this the amenity land would be bisected and there would be no access to the western parts of the amenity land.
3. Mr Clark said that many objectors were residents who did not immediately overlook the amenity land but were in favour of keeping the area open for communal use.

*Submissions from Counsel*

1. In respect of ground (a), Mr Holmes-Milner submitted that the restriction was not obsolete. There had been no material changes in the neighbourhood since the restrictions were imposed. The appeal land had been neglected on occasions but there was nothing that could not be rectified in relatively short order. He submitted that the applicants should not benefit from neglecting their own land. The erection of fences was not a material change and should the fences be removed then the original purpose of the restrictions could be achieved in substantial part.
2. As for ground (aa) – that the restriction impeded reasonable user of the land, Mr Holmes-Milner referred to the questions outlined in *Re Bass Ltd’s Application* (1973) 26 P&CR 156. He said that whilst the proposed user had planning consent, that was not in itself conclusive, relying on *Re Martins’ Application* (1989) 57 P&CR 119. He also submitted that the use was not reasonable because it was unlawful – in that it interfered with the right of way enjoyed by the objectors. The restriction did impede the user and in doing so probably secured practical benefits to the objectors which were of substantial value or advantage. For the outlying properties that did not immediately overlook the amenity land, the benefit was one of advantage rather than value, but, he argued, it must be a substantial advantage for all of the objecting properties to be able to use the amenity land. It was available to them, for their own restricted use, and preserved the ethos of the estate.
3. In considering whether money would be an adequate compensation for the loss of the restriction, Mr Holmes-Milner submitted that the onus was on the applicants to prove that this was the case. It would be very difficult indeed for it to be proved and no evidence had been submitted by the applicants in respect of the compensation. He emphasised the number of objection notices that referred to the attraction of the amenity land to the objectors and that its availability formed part of their decisions to purchase their properties.
4. In respect of ground (b), Mr Holmes-Milner submitted that this was patently not be made out as the majority of the other householders had objected to the application.
5. Turning to ground (c), Mr Holmes-Milner accepted that this may be most hopeful to the applicants. However it was for the applicants to make out that there was no injury to the objectors and it was on this ground that the thin end of the wedge concept bore most weight. He said that all that needed to happen was that incremental portions of the upper amenity land would become overgrown, have materials dumped on them or become neglected and the same observations that persuaded the local planning authority to grant consent on the appeal land would apply to that segment. This would continue until the small area of the amenity land that was left would be subsumed into private gardens. He referred to Mr Clark’s evidence that one neighbour had already attempted this but in fact the domino effect started in the far corner with No. 14 Home Farm Avenue and had spread out from there. Mr Holmes-Milner emphasised that on the facts of this case the thin end of the wedge argument had substance. The availability of volunteers to maintain the land fluctuated depending on the age profile of the various residents and it was inevitable that there would therefore be fluctuations in the quality of maintenance. This made the amenity land particularly vulnerable to a domino effect over time. Mr Holmes-Milner said that it was irrelevant to this application whether the lower land had been neglected. If it had that did not mean that it was unavailable for recreation but merely that recreation on it was difficult. He submitted that ground (c) had not been made out.
6. In summary, Mr Holmes-Milner said that this was a very unusual case owing to the existence of the right of way. That in itself should be enough to convince me not to exercise my discretion even if I were persuaded that one of the grounds under s84(1) of the Act had been made out. Mr Holmes-Milner stressed that every owner of houses on the estate had a right to come and go over the entirety of the amenity land. The discharge of the restriction on fences would not be determinative – as a matter of law only the abandonment by all forty householders of their easement would be determinative and this was entirely speculative, and not a matter over which I had jurisdiction.
7. He stressed that the discharge of the restriction would lead to an unequitable situation where the objectors would be prevented from entering the application land, whereas the applicants would have full access over the remainder of the amenity land. Further, under the conveyances, the objectors would each be liable for 1/40th of the cost of any work which the applicants carried out on land to which the objectors had no access.

**Discussion**

1. The application is made under paragraphs (a), (aa), (b) and (c) of section 84(1) of the Act. I start with ground (a), namely whether, by reasons of changes in the character of the property or neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the Tribunal may deem material, the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete.
2. Mr Clarke said that the covenant should be deemed obsolete because the character of the estate had changed since the restriction was entered into, and that since all of the houses were now owner occupied, the community ethos under the former housing society had been lost.
3. As Mr Holmes-Milner observed, correctly in my view, the key test is whether the original object of the restriction can still be achieved. I find that it can. The suggestion that increased owner occupation is a relevant factor fails because each restriction was entered into as part of a conveyance of the properties to owner occupiers. For the entirety of the time that the restriction has been in place therefore, the houses on the estate have been in owner occupation. Two of the four applicant parties originally entered into those restrictions. There was very little evidence of change since then and none, in my judgement, that showed a change in the character of the amenity land or the neighbourhood other than the erection of fences that could easily be removed. I am not persuaded that the application under ground (a) has been made out.
4. I now consider the application under paragraph (aa) by reference to the questions set out in *Re Bass’s Application.* First, whether the proposed user is reasonable? The applicants rely on the grant of planning permission as testament to the reasonableness of the use. Mr Holmes-Milner submitted that the grant of planning permission, whilst relevant, is not conclusive and relied upon *Re Martins’ Application*. He also said that the proposed user was unreasonable because it was unlawful in the sense that it would interfere with the rights of way enjoyed over the amenity land. In my view that is a slightly different point. The planning officers were clearly content that the use was a reasonable one, and having inspected the site and the application land, I am satisfied that the use, as domestic gardens in a domestic setting, is a reasonable one for the purposes of paragraph (aa). The next question is whether the restriction impedes that use. I remind myself at this point that the restriction is not one which prevents use as a garden, it is one which prevents that area of land being enclosed with fencing. To my mind it is difficult to conceive a private garden in a domestic setting without some form of boundaries, and that the creation of solid boundaries (although perhaps not hedges or other plants) would inevitably be impeded by the restriction. I am therefore satisfied that the restriction does impede the use to which the applicants wish to put the application land.
5. In terms of whether the proposed user secures practical benefits to the objectors, having considered the evidence and inspected the site, I have no doubt that it does. Each householder benefits from the use of the amenity land, of which the application land forms part, for recreational use. It is irrelevant to my mind whether the application land, by its nature, is unsuited to some forms of recreation. It would be suitable for other forms, be they birdwatching, nature-related activities or many others. On balance I am satisfied that the restriction is of substantial advantage to the objectors. Having answered that question in the affirmative, it is not necessary for me to consider compensation. Accordingly I find that the application under paragraph (aa) does not succeed.
6. In respect of the application under paragraph (b), Mr Clarke accepted at the hearing that there was little force in the application, and I find that it fails. The number of objections are substantial, and there is no evidence that the objectors expressly agreed that the restriction should be discharged. Nor is there sufficient evidence, in my judgement, of an agreement by implication owing to their acts or omissions. The application under paragraph (b) has not been made out.
7. Finally, in respect of paragraph (c), I agree with Counsel that the “thin end of the wedge” argument (ie that if the restriction is discharged in this case, then other applications for other parts of the amenity land will similarly be decided) on the facts of this case, is of particular relevance. There is something in the applicants’ argument that the lower land is different in nature to the upper land. But that difference, in my judgement, is not so stark as to prevent future gradual incursions into the upper land if the application were successful. The current situation shows that, if the restriction were discharged, the parties would already be somewhere down the metaphorical wedge. A precedent was set when the owner of 14 Home Farm Avenue enclosed his land. The subject application extends from that, and I accept Counsel’s submission that it would be inevitable that further enclosures would take place – as had already been attempted, temporarily, by the owner of 13 Hillend Lane. This would lead to injury to the objectors, as they would not benefit from access over the whole of the amenity land. Accordingly I find that the application under ground (c) has not been made out.
8. In the background to the individual considerations under grounds (a), (aa), (b) and (c) is the effect of the easement. Even had I been persuaded, as a first step, that the restriction should be discharged under an individual ground of s84(1), in my judgement that would have been negated by the existence of the easement, which would have led me in any event to decline to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicants. The application is for the discharge of part b) of the fourth schedule of each conveyance. That would still leave the other parts of that schedule, and the right of way reserved in the third schedule, in place. I accept Counsel’s submissions that this would lead to an inequitable and unworkable situation in which further dispute would be likely. The discharge of the covenant would remove one impediment to the enclosure of the amenity land, but it would not legitimise interference with the objector’s easement. It would be inappropriate to discharge the restriction in those circumstances.
9. I have some sympathy for the applicants, and accept that their intentions were an attempt at a pragmatic solution to what in their eyes is a problem that stems from what can hardly be described as a masterpiece of drafting when the conveyances were completed. However, in my judgment the objectors’ case is significantly stronger. It is hoped that the parties come to a voluntary compromise to avoid Clarke v Clark replicating *Jarndyce v Jarndyce*.

**Conclusion**

1. The applicants have not succeeded in establishing grounds (a), (aa), (b) or (c) of section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and the application is therefore refused. A letter on costs accompanies this decision, which will take effect when, but not until, the question of costs is decided. The attention of the parties is drawn to paragraph 12.5 of the Practice Directions of the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal dated 29 November 2010.

Dated 28 January 2015

P D McCrea FRICS

**APPENDIX**

**List of Objectors**

Mrs Lynda and Mr Jason Clark, 1 Home Farm Avenue

Mrs Elizabeth Benstead, 26 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Paul and Mrs Clare O’Brien, 16 Home Farm Avenue

Mr M and Mrs H Killick, 22 Home Farm Avenue

Mr R and Mrs W L Purcell, 2 Home Farm Avenue

Mr and Mrs R Taylor, 24 Home Farm Avenue

Mr William and Mrs Eileen Mussett, 20 Home Farm Avenue

Waseema H Daji, 28 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Paul Hodkinson and Ms Donna Perrin, 7 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Colin Shotbolt, 31 Home Farm Avenue

Mrs M P Winterbottom, 9 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Stephen and Mrs Enid Holden, 19 Home Farm Avenue

Mr and Mrs R Dixson, 10 Home Farm Avenue

Mrs Doris McHale, 5 Home Farm Avenue

Mr E and Mrs P A Saville, 8 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Stephen Croft, 6 Home Farm Avenue

Ms Christine Glynn, 23 Home Farm Avenue

Miss C A Thomas and Mr P S Thomas, 11 Home Farm Avenue

Mr J and Mrs J A Fallon, 18 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Fred Shanahan, 25 Home Farm Avenue

Mrs J K Decarle Riley, 21 Home Farm Avenue

Mr G Chenery and Mrs C Bowling, 15 Hillend Lane

Ms J Dillon and Mr J R Thompson, 30 Home Farm Avenue

Mr and Mrs J McCabe, 3 Home Farm Avenue

Mrs B Hey, 15 Home Farm Avenue

Mr John Burt and Mrs Jasmine Burt, 29 Home Farm Avenue

Mrs Barbara and Mr Anthony Wilcock, 4 Home Farm Avenue

Mr Alan Blaycock and Ms Janet Fischer, 27 Home Farm Avenue